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Abstract
Background: The reliability of signals is a key issue in the study of animal communication. Both empirical work and
theoretical models show that communication need not be entirely honest, and thus signals can be deceitful. Aggressive
communication appears to be a prime candidate for such deceitful communication, because bluffing has been described
in several species. Bluffing in these situations are supposed to be maintained by frequency dependent selection where
the fitness of a given type depends on the frequencies of the other types in the population. Previous efforts to model
such a scenario through individual based simulations have yielded conflicting results. Studies have either found a rich set
of polymorphic strategies including the traditional cheating scenario or found none. Thus, the modelling assumptions
responsible for these diverging conclusions remain unclear.
Results: In this study, I investigate the effects of four modelling assumptions: the role of an extended strategy set, the
initial population composition (seeding), the differences in pay-offs and finally different parameter spaces. I investigate the
effects of these factors on the evolvability of both honest and mixed cheating strategies. I show that both honest and
cheating equilibria readily evolve and that the investigated parameter range and the seeding of the starting populations
have the greatest influence on the outcome.
Conclusions: Both honest signalling and polymorphic cheating equilibria are more likely to evolve from a narrow strategy
set than from a random mixture of strategies. A large potential strategy set is not a setback for the evolution of
communication -honest or cheating- as long as the initial population is seeded with only a few strategies. In addition,
different sections of the parameter space show consistently different behaviour. Thus, frequency dependent selection has
the potential to explain various empirical observations that show consistent differences in aggressive behaviour.
Keywords: Honest signalling, Deception, Mixed ESS, Frequency dependent selection, Aggressive communication, Animal
personality
Background
Honest signalling has dominated discussions of animal
signalling systems in the last few decades [1, 2]. How-
ever, it has been clear since early studies that animal
communication need not be honest all the time [3, 4].
There is a growing body of literature on the use of dis-
honest signals in nature, in organism from microbes [5]
to humans [6, 7]. Such deceptive signals can be used
within or between species (intra vs. interspecific cheat-
ing). Between species these deceptive signals include
various forms of mimicry (see review [8]): Batesian and
Müllerian mimicry in butterflies [9, 10] and in fish [11];
myrmecomorphy in insects [12]; aggressive mimicry [13,
14]; and mimicry in cleaner-client systems [15]. Within
species these deceptive signals include bluffing in the
context of aggressive communication in stomatopods
[16] fiddler crabs (Uca annulipes) [17], and American
goldfinches (Carduelis tristis) [18]; and sexual mimicry
in many species such as bluegill sunfish (Lepomis macro-
hirus) [19, 20], damselflies (Ischnura ramburi) [21] and
red-sided garter snakes (Thamnophis sirtalis parietalis)
[22]. A growing number of theoretical papers attempt to
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both in general and in the context of aggressive commu-
nication [23–29].
Explaining honest communication or even a mixture
of honest and dishonest signals presents a special
challenge in the context of aggressive communication
[30, 31] because a clear-cut conflict of interest exists be-
tween participants. Early theoretical models [32] have
been highly sceptical about the possibility of honest sig-
nalling during aggressive interactions. Enquist [33] was
the first to show that conventional signals can be honest
and evolutionarily stable in this context. Enquist’s model
[33] can be seen as a modified version of the Hawk-
Dove game [32] with a free communication round in
which players can be weak or strong. Players know their
own states, but their states cannot be seen by observers.
Enquist asked whether cost free signals emitted at the
communication stage can reliably transmit information
about this unobservable quality. To answer this question,
he investigated two global strategies (see detailed
definitions below): to be honest and to lie (cheat). He
proposed an honest equilibrium where weak and strong
individuals use different signals, and weak individuals
avoid fighting with strong individuals. Cheaters are weak
individuals who mimic the signal of the strong individ-
uals. Enquist has shown that as long as potential
cheaters are unable to flee from the attack of honest
strong individuals, there is a fighting cost threshold that
prevents the spread of cheating in an honest population.
Both the model and the results were ground-breaking at
that time, because Enquist was the first to show that
variation in behaviour can be a reliable signal and also
that the receiver’s response can maintain the signal’s
honesty.
Enquist’s model, like most signalling games, assumes
consistent individual variation between individuals. Ani-
mal personality research is a newly emerging and rapidly
growing field with the primary goal of studying such in-
dividual differences ([34, 35]). Consistent individual vari-
ation has been shown to exist in many contexts,
including aggression ([36, 37]). Individual variation also
appears to carry over to signalling, and some examples
of this phenomenon can be classified as cheating. For
example, in recent studies Akcay and colleagues [38, 39]
have found consistent “under” and “over” signalling be-
haviour in which aggressive individuals underuse, and
less aggressive individuals over-use, threat displays. Po-
tential examples of cheating are also found in other spe-
cies, such as fiddler crabs [17] and goldfinches [18].
Despite extensive animal personality research, theoret-
ical models attempting to explain the source of variation
are rare. [40]. As a result, current empirical findings are
still challenging to explain. In this paper, I suggest that
frequency dependent-selection can offer an explanation
for many of these observations.
Számadó [24] has proposed frequency dependent se-
lection to explain cheating behaviour in Enquist’s
game; he has shown that honest and cheating strat-
egies can co-exist in a mixed equilibrium. This mixed
equilibrium can be implemented in two different
ways: (i) either a fixed proportion of weak individuals
cheat (p) and the remaining portion remains honest
(1-p), (ii) or each weak individual cheats with a prob-
ability p and stays honest with probability 1-p. Later
Szalai & Számadó [25] (abbreviated as SS09) utilised
an extended version of this game with individual
based simulations to investigate other possible strat-
egies, such as strong cheaters or individuals who al-
ways attack or always flee while ignoring signals (see
Additional file 1: Appendix 1 for detailed definitions
of these strategies). They have found a diverse set of
honest and cheating equilibria that have different
combinations of these strategies. However, the validity
of this type of equilibrium has been challenged by a
later study. First, Hamblin & Hurd [41] concluded
that no honest equilibrium evolved; in fact, no signal-
ling equilibrium -mixed or pure- evolved in the first
place when using random or close to random initial
populations. Later, Helgesen et al. [42] (abbreviated as
H13) heavily criticised Számadó [24] and Szalai &
Számadó [25] for using a limited strategy set (i.e.,
there are more than eight possible strategies in
Enquist’s game) and slightly different pay-offs relative
to those in previous versions [43]. They reiterated the
conclusion of Hamblin & Hurd [41] and also claimed
that no equilibrium with mixed cheating evolves in
individual based simulations. They went as far as to
claim, “Intuition and common sense have it that ani-
mals communicate using ambiguous threat displays
that have an underlying probabilistic mixed strategy
type of mechanism, but there remains no working
game theoretical model of such a communication sys-
tem” (Helgesen et al., [42] abstract).
It is important to resolve this controversy to decide
whether frequency dependent selection can serve as a
valid explanation for individual differences in aggressive
contexts. Unfortunately, Helgesen et al. [42] used a com-
pletely different set of modelling assumptions than Szalai
& Számadó [25], thus making it impossible to determine
whether the effect claimed by Helgesen et al. [42] (i.e.
lack of communication and mixed cheating) is the result
of the introduction of a new, larger strategy set and a
modified pay-off matrix or the result of other modelling
assumptions. Here, I re-investigate those claims by using
the strategy set and the pay-off matrix suggested by
Helgesen et al. [42] and I also investigate the role of ini-
tial population composition and parameter space; other-
wise, I use the modelling setup and assumptions of
Szalai & Számadó [25].
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Methods
Enquist’s model [33] is a symmetric game of aggressive
communication where two animals fight for the same
resource. The players can be weak or strong, where q
and 1-q give the frequencies of weak and strong indi-
viduals respectively. Each player knows its own state;
however, the state of the opponent remains hidden.
The game can be divided into three stages (see Fig. 1):
(i) Nature decides the state of each player, (ii) each
player can choose between two signals A or B, these
signals are assumed to be free of production cost; fi-
nally (iii) each player can choose between three actions:
flee, attack or attack conditionally. Conditional attack
implies that the player waits for the opponent to with-
draw and it attacks only if the other player stays to
fight. Let V denote the value of the contested resource,
this resource cannot be divided between the contes-
tants. There are four cost parameters associated with
fighting behaviour in the model. Enquist [33] assumed
that a strong individual can always beat a weak individ-
ual, where CSW, and CWS denote the cost of fighting for
strong and weak player respectively. It is further as-
sumed that the cost suffered by the weak player is lar-
ger than the cost paid by the strong one, hence the
following relation holds: CWS > CSW. Weak or strong in-
dividuals fighting between each other has an equal
chance to win a fight, where CWW and CSS denote the
expected costs. Overall, we assume the following rela-
tions between these costs: CWS > CWW, CSS > CSW.
There are three cost parameters associated with fleeing
in the model. Let Ff denote the cost of fleeing and FA,
denote the cost of attacking a fleeing opponent. Finally,
let FP denote the cost of waiting when the opponent at-
tacks unconditionally. It is usually assumed that these
costs are small compared to fighting costs, i.e.: Csw >
FA, FP [43].
Two more important considerations are involved: the
source of variation and the strategy set available to the
players. Enquist’s [33] model makes sense only if there is
a polymorphism of weak and strong individuals.
Enquist’s model [33] assumes a fixed 0.5 ratio between
weak and strong individuals, whereas both Hurd’s model
(1997) and later Számadó’s [24] first model consider a
fixed ratio between 0 and 1. Számadó’s [24] second
model further relaxes of this assumption by having a ra-
tio that can change during the course of evolution. Szalai
& Számadó’s model [25] followed Számadó’s [24] second
model, in which the frequency of the alleles that regulate
the ratio of strong to weak individuals is an evolutionary
variable. In contrast Helgesen et al. [42] have used a
fixed ratio of weak vs. strong individuals that is rando-
mised for every play. Thus, whereas the models of
Enquist [33], Hurd [43], and Helgesen et al. [42], and
Számadó [24] first model, assume an exogenous explan-
ation for the polymorphism of weak and strong individ-
uals, Számadó’s [24] second model and Szalai &
Számadó’s model [25] provide an endogenous explan-
ation. Notably, the model implemented by Szalai &
Számadó [25] is not a choice-of-state model, as has been
erroneously claimed by H13: the chance of playing
‘strong’ or ‘weak’ is regulated by the alleles of a gene;
thus, it is not up to individual choice. Because Szalai and
Számadó [25] investigated a model with an endogenous
explanation, here, I also implement the same version.
Fig. 1 Schematic description of the Enquist game [33]. Stage zero: Nature picks a state for the contestants; this stage is hidden from other
players. Stage one: each contestant picks a signal, A or B. Stage two: each contestant picks a behaviour as a response to the signal: Flee (F),
Conditional Attack (CA) or Attack (At)
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The original model consists of only two global strat-
egies (honesty vs. cheating; Enquist, [33]. Enquist inves-
tigated the following honest global strategy denoted S
(Enquist, [33]; p. 1155):
“If strong, show A; if the opponent also shows A attack
and if the opponent shows B, repeat A and attack only
if it does not withdraw immediately. If weak show B
and give up if the opponent shows A and attack if the
opponent shows B.”
The evolutionary stability of this honest global strategy
S was investigated against a simple cheating type in
which weak individuals show A instead of B. This cheat-
ing strategy was not explicitly defined by Enquist; the
corresponding global strategy can be written up as fol-
lows (Számadó [24]; p. 222):
“Display always A in the first round, regardless of
strength; then in the second round if strong attack
unconditionally if opponent shows A or wait until
opponent flees if it has shown B; if weak withdraw if
opponent signals A or wait until opponent flees if it
has shown B.”
Figure 2 shows a schematic representation of the po-
tential strategies and gives Honest Strong as an example.
Each individual has 7 genes. The first one encodes the
strength of the individual (weak or strong). The next
three encode behaviour when weak: (i) signal when weak
(A or B), (ii) response to signal A when weak (flee, con-
ditional attack, attack), (iii) response to signal B when
weak (flee, conditional attack, attack); finally, the last
three genes encode behaviour when strong: (v) signal
when strong (A or B), (vi) response to signal A when
strong (flee, conditional attack, attack), and finally (vii)
response to signal B when strong (flee, conditional at-
tack, attack).
Szalai and Számadó investigated eight strategies, see
Fig. 3 for representations and Additional file 1:
Appendix 1 for definitions of these strategies. There are,
however, more than eight strategies in Enquist’s game,
and the full set has been investigated by Helgesen et al.
[42] (see Additional file 1: Appendix 2). It is important
to note that altough on paper there are 324 (18 × 18)
possible pure strategies in the model, most of these
strategies are redundant if the actual behaviour of any
individual is examined. Because individuals are weak or
strong for life, in the current implementation of the
model, therefore half of their genes will be never
expressed (see Figs. 2 and 3). When classifying the be-
haviour of the individuals, these inactive genes can be
safely ignored, thus greatly simplifying the analysis. Not-
ably, these inactive alleles are still present (even if they
are not used for classification), and they can be turned
on by mutation. Accordingly, I will consider only 36
strategies in the further analysis (see Additional file 1:
Appendix 2).
Fig. 2 Schematic representation of the coding of the behaviour of
individuals. Each individual has seven genes: the first gene
represents the state of the individual (weak or strong), the next
three and the last three encodes the behaviour of the individual
depending on whether the state of the individual is weak or strong
respectively. Out of these three genes the first gene gives which
signal to use; the second gene encodes which behaviour to use as a
response to signal A; and finally, the last gene encodes which
behaviour to use as a response to signal B. W: weak; S: strong; F:
Flee; CA: Conditional Attack; At: Attack. Asterisks denote silent
regions which do not influence the behaviour of the given
individual. The “genom” of an individual playing the Honest Strong
strategy is at the bottom as an example
Fig. 3 Schematic representation of the eight behavioural strategies
that were used in the Szalai and Számadó model [25]. W: weak; S:
strong; F: Flee; CA: Conditional Attack; At: Attack. Asterisks denote
silent regions which do not influence the behaviour of the
given individual
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Szalai and Számadó [25] investigated only 8 strategies;
however, they investigated more than 10,000 parameter
combinations (see Table 1). Hamblin & Hurd [41] inves-
tigated all of the possible 324 strategy combinations;
however, they investigated only a small fraction of the
possible parameter space (12 parameter combinations,
see Table 2). Additionaly, the two groups -Szalai and
Számadó [25] and Helgesen et al. [42]- have used slightly
different versions of the pay-off matrix; this difference is
most noticeable at the flee vs. flee option (for compari-
son of pay-offs see Table 3). Here, I investigate both ver-
sions. Here I also change the genetic representation of
the strategy set from Szalai & Számadó [25] to the one
suggested by Helgesen et al., [42] (see further details in
Fig. 2 and Additional file 1: Appendix 2) to allow the full
strategy set to evolve.
The feasibility of the evolvability of honest and cheat-
ing equilibria is assessed by individual based simulations.
Here I investigate the effect of differences in (i) pay-offs
and (ii) the effect of initial composition on the evolu-
tionary trajectories of these populations, using the ex-
tended strategy set as suggested by Helgesen et al. [42]
while keeping the other modelling assumptions the same
as those in Szalai and Számadó [25] (i.e., number of
fights and source of variation). To investigate the effect
of initial strategy distribution, I use two different setups:
either (i) seeding the population randomly from all the
possible 36 strategies, or (ii) using the eight strategies
used by SS09 to seed the initial population in order to
compare the effects of switching from 8 strategies to the
full strategy space.
All in all, I investigate evolvability with the following
four different setups: (i) the initial population consists of
random strategies drawn from the full set using the
SS09 pay-offs; (ii) the initial population consists of ran-
dom strategies drawn from the full set using the H13
pay-offs; (iii) the initial population consists of eight strat-
egies used by SS09 using the SS09 pay-offs; and finally,
(iv) the initial population consists of eight strategies used
by SS09 using the H13 pay-offs. I use the full strategy
set in all of these investigations as suggested by H13 (i.e.
any of the possible strategies can evolve even if they are
not present in the initial distribution), and I investigate
parameter regions from the SS09 and H13 studies.
Of the vast parameter space investigated by SS09 I in-
vestigate only those sections where main signalling
equilibria evolved in the original study (see
Additional file 2: Dataset 1). Szalai and Számadó have
[25] found six such equilibria: (i) Honest-strong,
Honest-weak, which is the traditional honest signalling
outcome (SS09 code: 3; current code: <30,2>); (ii)
Honest-strong, Liar-strong, this is an “all-strong” honest
signalling outcome where strong individuals signal
differences in intentions (fight vs. flee) with the use of
the signal (SS09 code: 5; current code: <30,20>); (iii)
Honest-strong, Honest-weak, Liar-weak, which is the
“traditional” cheating scenario (SS09 code: 11; current
code: <30,2,14>); (iv) Honest-strong, Liar-strong, Liar-
weak, which can be viewed as an “all-strong” cheating
scenario in which the weak strategy imitates one of the
strong ones (SS09 code: 13; current code: <30,20,14>);
(v) Honest-strong, Honest-weak, Liar-strong, Liar-weak,
which is a “full-scale” cheating scenario (SS09 code: 15;
current code: <30,2,20,14>);.and finally, (vi) Honest-
strong, Honest-weak, Liar-weak, Coward, this is an “all-
strong” cheating scenario with cowards (SS09 code: 27;
current code: <30,2,14,8,17>). The “current code” gives
the code of pure strategies (according to Additional file 1:
Appendix 2) supporting the given polymorphic equilib-
rium. These parameter regions are denoted by the code
of the strategy combination used by SS09 (code3, code5,
etc.). Out of these parameter regions 500–500 parameter
combinations were drawn randomly and 10 independent
runs were made with each combination. All in all, 3000
parameter combinations were investigated from the
SS09 study. See Additional file 2: Dataset 1 for the
Table 1 Szalai and Számadó [25] parameter space
Parameter Start End Step
V 1 34 3
CSS 10 35 5
CWW 2 32 5
CSW 10 35 5
CWS 2 32 5
Fp 0 min(CSS, CWW, CSW, CWS) 3
Where V denotes the value of the contested resource, CWW and CSS denote the
expected costs of a fight between two weak and two strong individuals
respectively; CSW, and CWS is the expected cost for a strong animal fighting a
weak and vice versa; and finally, Fp denotes the cost of waiting if the
opponent attacks unconditionally. The following relation holds between these
costs: CSS > CWS > CWW, and CSS > CSW > CWW; combinations that do not fit these
conditions were not investigated. All in all, cc 10,000 parameter combinations
were investigated
Table 2 Helgesen et al., [42] parameter space
Parameter Standard E85 model Choice-of-state model
V 100 100
CSS 15 100, 200
CWW 15 15
CSW 15 75
CWS 50, 70 50, 75
Fa 5 5
Fp 5 5
Ff 0, 5 0, 5
Where V denotes the value of the contested resource, CWW and CSS denote the
expected costs of a fight between two weak and two strong individuals
respectively; CSW, and CWS is the expected cost for a strong animal fighting a
weak and vice versa; and finally, Fp denotes the cost of waiting if the
opponent attacks unconditionally
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parameter combinations and results of the SS09 study;
and Additional file 3: Dataset 2 for the details of the 6
parameter regions described above. Finally, I investigate
the evolvability of mixed cheating with the H13 param-
eter range as well (see Table 2), using the same model-
ling assumptions and same variation in pay-offs and
initial strategy distributions as for the SS09 parameter
space. See Table 4 for a comparison of the main differ-
ences between the two studies and for the general setup
of the current study. Further details of the computer
simulations are described in Additional file 1: Appendix
3, and Additional file 4: Table S1 summarises all of the
investigated scenarios.
Results
The evolutionary trajectories of the populations are
clearly strongly influenced by all investigated factors.
The frequencies of honest, cheating and no-signalling
equilibria are given in Additional file 4: Table S2 (the full
dataset is available at Mendely data as Számadó2017_re-
sults.csv). Figure 4 shows the results of the computer
simulations as a function of (i) pay-off (SS09 vs. H13),
(ii) initial population composition (random vs. eight
strategies) and (iii) parameter ranges (SS09 vs. H13).
Figure 5 further classifies the results as a function of the
parameter sets of the SS09 study, i.e. code3, code5,
code11, code13, code15, code 27.
Pay-offs
It is clear that the SS09 pay-offs are indeed more
favourable for polymorphic cheating equilibria than the
pay-offs proposed by H13. However, changing the pay-
offs does not explain the completely opposite outcome,
as such polymorphic cheating equilibria still evolve with
the H13 pay-offs.
Initial population composition
Seeding the populations with only 8 strategies (8S) in-
stead of 36 (36S) favours the evolution of honest or dis-
honest polymorphic equilibria depending on the
parameter regions (Fig. 5). Notably, with random seed-
ing, the frequency of honest strategies takes a hit as a
strong or even stronger than that of mixed cheating. In
other words, random seeding strongly favours the evolu-
tion of no-signalling regardless of the pay-offs. Figures 6,
7 and 8 show examples of when change of seeding re-
sults in no-signalling outcomes with the same pay-offs
and parameter combinations in three regions (code3,
code5, code11).
Parameter regions
Populations respond differently to changes in pay-offs in
different parameter regions. On the one hand, the out-
come is not sensitive to the changes in pay-offs (SS09 vs.
H13) in those regions where honest strategies dominate
with 8S seeding (Fig. 5. code3, code5). On the other
Table 3 Combined payoffs matrix
Opponent strength
Strong Weak
Ego Strength Attack Cond. attack Flee Attack Cond. attack Flee
Attack 0.5 V–CSS 0.5 V–CSS V-FA V-CSW V-CSW V-FA
Strong Cond. attack 0.5 V–CSS-FP 0.5 V–CSS V V-CSW-FP V-CSW V
Flee (S00) - CSS 0 0.5 V–CSS - CSW 0 0.5 V
Flee (SS09) - CSS + Ff 0 0.5 V–CSS - CSW + Ff 0 0.5 V
Flee (H13) - CSS 0 0.5 V - CSW 0 0.5 V
Attack -CWS -CWS V-FA 0.5 V–CWW 0.5 V–CWW V-FA
Cond. attack -CWS-FP -CWS V 0.5 V–CWW-FP 0.5 V–CWW V
Weak Flee (S00) - CWS 0 0.5 V - CWW 0 0.5 V–CWW
Flee (SS09) - CWS + Ff 0 0.5 V - CWW + Ff 0 0.5 V–CWW
Flee (H13) - CWS 0 0.5 V - CWW 0 0.5 V
Bold letters denote differences in pay-offs in the Flee choice: Flee(S00) Számadó [24], Flee(SS09) Szalai & Számadó [25], Flee(H13) Helgesen et al., [42]. V: value of
the contested resource; CSS, CWW: expected cost of fight between equal opponents; CSW: cost for strong individual to beat weak one; CWS: cost to weak individual
when beaten by strong one; Ff: cost of fleeing; FA: cost of attacking fleeing opponent; FP: cost of waiting if the opponent attacks unconditionally
Table 4 The main differences between the Szalai and Számadó
[25] (SS09) and the Helgesen et al. [42] (H13) studies
SS09 H13 current study
number of
strategies






parameter range cc. 10,000 12 both
initial population 8 strategies 18 × 18
strategies
8 or 36
variation in state endogenous fixed ratio endogenous
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hand, the outcome is sensitive to the changes in pay-offs
in parameter regions where dishonest polymorphic equi-
libria dominate with 8S seeding (Fig. 5. code11, code13,
code15, code27). A prime example of this phenomenon
is region code27 where changes in pay-offs reverse the
results, from almost complete domination of
polymorphic equilibria to almost complete absence of
these types of equilibria. Regarding the parameter range,
the worst-case scenario for mixed equilibria is the H13
parameter region used by Helgesen et al. [42]; in this re-
gion (Fig. 5. Helgesen et al.), polymorphic equilibria are
almost absent even with the beneficial pay-offs (SS09)
Fig. 4 Different types of outcomes observed in the individual simulations: (i) no-signalling: white; (ii) honest signalling: green; (iii) cheating equilibria: orange.
36S and 8S denotes seeding with random initial strategy distribution and seeding with the eight strategies used by Szalai & Számadó [25] respectively; finally,
SS09 denotes the pay-offs used by Szalai & Számadó [25]; while H13 denotes the pay-offs used by Helgesen et al. [42]
Fig. 5 The distribution of equilibrium strategies as a function parameter range, pay-offs and initial strategy composition. Colour codes are as follows: (i) no-
signalling: white; (ii) honest signalling: green; (iii) cheating equilibria: orange. Thirty-six and 8 denotes random initial strategy distribution and populations
seeded with the eight strategies used by Szalai & Számadó [25] respectively; S: denotes the pay-offs used by Szalai & Számadó [25]; while H denotes the
pay-offs used by Helgesen et al., [42]. Parameter ranges are Szalai & Számadó, [25] and Helgesen et al., [42]; code* denote a list of parameter combinations
where the following strategies evolved in Szalai & Számadó [25]: code3: Honest-strong, Honest-weak; code5: Honest-strong, Liar-strong; code11: Honest-
strong, Honest-weak, Liar-weak; code13: Honest-strong, Liar-strong, Liar-weak; code15: Honest-strong, Honest-weak, Liar-strong, Liar-weak; code27: Honest-
strong, Honest-weak, Liar-weak, Coward. The upper panel shows the total number of runs made in the given parameter range
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and favourable seeding (8S). Additional file 5: Figure S1
and Additional file 6: Figure S2 provide examples of in-
dividual timelines from the SS09 and H13 parameter re-
gions respectively. Figure 9 shows the frequency and the
composition of the major equilibria (found in more than
0.01% of the runs) that evolve with the SS09 parameter
set (see Additional file 4: Table S3). The combination of
the H13 pay-offs and random initial population is clearly
the most unfavourable combination for the evolution of
cheating (see Fig. 9b). Notably, this combination is also
the least favourable for the evolution of honest equilib-
ria. Switching to the SS09 pay-offs yields honest and
cheating equilibria (Fig. 9a) but the most frequently ob-
served outcomes are still populations with no-signalling.
Fig. 6 Ten independent timelines of the parameter combination: 984 (parameter combinations are defined in SI file 2). Pay-offs: H13; parameter
region: code3. Each figure shows five-five independent runs with the same parameter combination: (a, left column) 36 strategy seed, (b, right
column) 8 strategy seed. Strategy codes are displayed on the right. V = 13.0, Css = 20.0, Cww = 7.0, Cws = 15.0, Csw = 17.0, Ff = 0.0
Fig. 7 Ten independent timelines of the parameter combination: 6269. Pay-offs: H13; parameter region: code5; (a) 36 strategy seed, (b) 8 strategy
seed. V = 34.0, Css = 30.0, Cww = 12.0, Cws = 30.0, Csw = 12.0, Ff = 0.0
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Fig. 8 Ten independent timelines of the parameter combination: 4226. Pay-offs: H13; parameter region: code11; (a) 36 strategy seed, (b) 8
strategy seed. V = 22.0, Css = 35.0, Cww = 12.0, Cws = 30.0, Csw = 27.0, Ff = 9.0
Fig. 9 The composition and the frequency of the major equilibria (found in more than 0.01% out of 73,530 runs) that evolved using the SS09 parameter
range in four different scenarios: a SS09 pay-offs, random initial strategy composition; b H13 pay-offs, random initial strategy composition; c SS09 pay-offs,
seeded with 8S of SS09; d H13 pay-offs, seeded with 8S of SS09. Orange dots on the right side show the observed frequencies of these strategy
combinations, values can be found in Additional file 4: Table S3. The size of the blue dots is proportional to the average frequency of the given pure
strategy at the equilibrium, the red circle is proportional to the standard deviation. Green, yellow and grey lines denote honest, cheating and no-signalling
equilibria respectively
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Switching to initial populations seeded with the eight
strategies used by SS09 results in a drastic change: hon-
est equilibria are amongst the most frequent outcomes
regardless of the pay-offs (<20,30 > and <2,30>; see
Fig. 9c and d). Cheating also evolves more readily and it
is favoured more by the SS09 pay-offs (see Fig. 9a vs. b
and c vs. d).
Figure 10 shows the frequency and the composition of
the major equilibria that evolved with the H13 param-
eter set (see Additional file 4: Table S4). Again, it is clear
that the H13 set is the most unfavourable parameter set
for both mixed cheating and honest signalling; It is also
worth to note that the Helgesen et al. [42] parameter re-
gion is the only region which is completely insensible to
changes in the modelling assumptions; it is the only par-
ameter region where no-signalling dominates regardless
of the seeding or the pay-offs (Figs. 4, 5 and 10).
Over all, the most favourable combination of pay-offs
and seeding for honest and cheating equilibria to evolve
is provided by the original SS09 setup (i.e. the combin-
ation of the SS09 pay-offs and 8S seeding). Dishonest
polymorphic equilibria still evolve in most of the SS09
parameter regions with the H13 pay-offs. In contrast,
the least favourable combination of pay-offs, seeding and
parameter range is the combination used in the Helge-
sen et al. [42] study: H13 pay-offs with random seeding
of 36 strategies, using the H13 parameter range.
Discussion
Here, I investigated the effects of four modelling
assumptions on the evolutionary trajectories of popula-
tions playing a simple game of aggressive communica-
tion. The factors investigated were: the overall strategy
set, the initial strategy composition, the pay-off matrix
and finally the parameter space. All of these factors in-
fluence the outcome, yet their importance varies. The
least important factor is perhaps the introduction of the
full strategy set. Both honest and cheating strategies
readily evolve if all the modelling assumptions of SS09
hold constant otherwise (and in fact they are amongst
the most frequent strategies, see Fig. 9c).
The next most important factor is the pay-offs.
Whereas the SS09 pay-off matrix indeed favours the
evolution of polymorphic dishonest equilibria (i.e. cheat-
ing), switching to the H13 pay-offs never results in the
complete disappearance of mixed cheating (see Figs. 4
and 5). Switching to the H13 pay-offs does result in the
disappearance of honest and cheating strategies from the
Fig. 10 The composition and the frequency of the major equilibria (found in more than 0.01% out of 3600 runs) that evolved in the H13 parameter range
in four different scenarios: a SS09 pay-offs, random initial strategy composition; b H13 pay-offs, random initial strategy composition; c SS09 pay-offs, seeded
with 8S of SS09; b H13 pay-offs, seeded with 8S of SS09. Orange dots on the right side show the observed frequencies of these strategy combinations,
values can be found in Additional file 4: Table S4. The size of the blue dots is proportional to the average frequency of the given pure strategy at the
equilibrium, the red circle is proportional to the standard deviation. Green, yellow and grey lines denote honest, cheating and no-signalling
equilibria respectively
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most frequent strategies when the seeding consists of all
the possible strategies (see Figs. 9a vs. b), however
switching to the H13 pay-offs has a much smaller effect
when the original seeding consists of 8 strategies (Fig. 9c
vs. d).
Changing the initial strategy composition from random
to the 8 strategies used by SS09 always results significant
changes in the outcome regardless of the parameter
space or pay-offs (see Figs. 9 and 10a, vs. c, and b, vs. d,
respectively). In all cases this change favours the evolu-
tion of signalling: both honest and cheating equilibria
are more frequent.
Finally, the choice of parameter space influences the
results significantly. For example, when the H13 param-
eter space is used neither honest nor cheating equilibria
evolve to be amongst the most frequent equilibria with
random initial populations regardless of the pay-offs
(Fig. 10a vs. b), whereas different regions of the SS09
parameter space favour the evolution of honest equilib-
ria (code3, code5) or mixed cheating (code11, code13,
code15; see Fig. 5).
Additionally, although most of the criticism by
Helgesen et al. [42] concerned the changes in pay-offs,
this change alone never results the complete disappear-
ance of cheating equilibria (see Figs. 5 and 9). Contrary
to the claims of H13, at least three modelling assump-
tions must be changed relative to SS09 to obtain a dras-
tic decrease in cheating (and honest) strategies: the
overall strategy set, the composition of the initial popu-
lations and the pay-offs (see Fig. 9b). All four assump-
tions (strategy set, initial strategy composition, pay-offs,
parameter range) must be changed to obtain an almost
complete disappearance of signalling, both honest and
dishonest (see Figs. 4, 5 and 10) as reported by Helgesen
et al. [42]. The results also show that despite the claims
of Helgesen et al. [42] the parameter range they used in
their study is not representative of the Szalai and
Számadó [25] parameter range. Finally, while the cri-
tique of Helgesen et al. [42] was questioned the exist-
ence of mixed cheating, the changes introduced by
Helgesen et al. [42] equally effect the evolvability of hon-
est equilibria as well.
The current results show, in accordance with the pre-
vious results of Szalai and Számadó [25], that the evolu-
tionary attractors of cheating as well as honest equilibria
are more restricted than those of the no-signalling equi-
libria. This result, although hardly surprising, does sug-
gest that these kinds of equilibria are unlikely to evolve
out of populations using a random set of initial strat-
egies. However, no one expects signalling to evolve out
of a random set of behaviours; in fact, there is good rea-
son to assume that signalling (honest or cheating) is pre-
ceded by cues that are informative in some way. This is
the equivalent of already existing correlations, i.e. the
equivalent of seeding populations with a more restricted
strategy set [25]. Szalai & Számadó [25] provide a long
discussion about these potential cues in the context of
aggressive communication i.e. “frozen” first steps of
fighting techniques (see also [44, 45]).
Finally, I discuss an empirical example in detail: the
“soft song”. Soft songs are low-amplitude calls observed
in a number of species, mostly in aggressive context
[46]. Empirical studies have shown that among the song
types associated with an aggressive context, such as song
type switching, song matching, and soft-song [47], only
soft song predicts the probability of attack. Soft song is a
reliable predictor of attack in song sparrows (Melospiza
melodia) [31, 48, 49], swamp sparrows (Melospiza geor-
giana) [50] and black-throated blue warblers (Dendroica
caerulescens) [51]. Soft song has number of features that
are consistent with the Enquist model: (i) it has a negli-
gible production cost (signals in the Enquist model are
assumed to be cost-free); (ii) the honesty of soft song is
maintained by “receiver retaliation” [31, 49, 52], i.e., by
the receiver’s reaction to the signal, as is the case in the
Enquist model. It has recently revealed that individual
variation exists in some species [38]. There are “over”
and “under” signallers, such that less aggressive
individuals signal more frequently, whereas some
aggressive individuals signal less frequently. In the ter-
minology of the current model, these behaviours are the
equivalent of the Liar-strong and Liar-weak strategies. If
the honest strategies are assumed to be present in the
population, this scenario is the Honest-strong, Honest-
weak, Liar-strong, Liar-weak equilibrium (c15; current
code: <30,2,20,14>). Szalai and Számadó [25] found this
combination amongst the six most frequent outcomes.
This outcome disappears with the introduction of the
H13 pay-offs (see Additional file 4: Table S3), a slightly
different version is still observed with a different kind of
dishonest weak strategy <30,2,20,12>. While Akcay and
colleagues [38] list a number of possible explanations for
the existence of under- and over-signalling, frequency
dependent selection is not among the possible explana-
tions. The current model, together with the previous re-
sults [24, 25], offers a potential explanation, namely, that
frequency dependent selection may explain the existence
of polymorphic equilibria in aggressive communication
in which several strategies can co-exist at equilibrium,
including honest and various cheating strategies (i.e.
“over” and “under” signallers).
Conclusions
Previous models have shown that mixed cheating can be
explained by frequency dependent selection, that these
equilibria can be evolutionarily stable [24] and that these
equilibria can evolve under appropriate conditions [25].
The current study supports this conclusion as it shows
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that frequency-dependent selection can maintain a di-
verse set of strategies at equilibrium; thus, it has a cur-
rently underappreciated role in explaining diversity in
nature in the context of aggressive communication. Out
of the four factors investigated in the current study, the
initial strategy composition and the choice of parameter
space appear to be the most influential and to be equally
important in determining the evolutionary trajectories of
the populations. The current study shows that when
searching for the origins of honest or dishonest signal-
ling one must look for more than a random mixture of
behaviours.
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